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T irtually all government policies alter
the allocation of economic resources.
The timing of the policies, the nature of
government spending, and the form of
revenue collection affect decision-making
over time, change the distribution of
costs and benefits across households and
firms, and reshuffle the burdens borne
by different generations. Whether in-
tended or not, allocative consequences
are the reality of economic policy.
The far-reaching changes in spending
and tax priorities represented by the
Clinton administration's stimulus pack-
age and first budget proposal are no ex-
ception. In this Economic Commen-
tary, we present an overview of the
Clinton plan that emphasizes the timing
of spending and revenue changes, the
fiscal mix that the plan would deliver,
and the generational impact of the
proposals as a whole. We neither en-
dorse nor condemn the plan or any of
its components; nor do we survey em-
pirical or theoretical arguments for one
position or another. Our goal is to
present the material in a way that will
help readers come to their own con-
clusions about the desirability of the
budget proposal on its own terms.
Our focal point is the plan detailed in
the document A Vision of Change for
America (henceforth referred to as
Vision), issued by the Office of Man-
agement and Budget (OMB) on Febru-
ary 17, 1993, and in Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year
1994, issued April 8, 1993.' Although
revisions have already been proposed
in both the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives, it is useful to concentrate on
the original administration proposals for
two reasons. First, the basics of the plan
have remained intact, at least through
the early stages of the budget process.
Second, the administration's budget
proposals provide a relevant benchmark
by which all amendments and alterna-
tives can be judged.
In our presentation we rely, as much as
possible, on calculations provided by
the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).
The numbers presented by the adminis-
tration differ somewhat from the CBO
figures, due largely to technical correc-
tions and to differences in the baseline
from which deficit changes are calcu-
lated. We briefly describe these adjust-
ments in the next section, presenting the
bottom-line deficit reduction implied
by the Clinton plan of $355 billion over
the period from fiscal year (FY) 1993
through FY1998.
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The remaining sections of this article
present the timing and composition of
net outlay cuts, the timing and composi-
tion of net revenue increases, and the
generational impact of each. We show
that 1) the majority of deficit cuts, in
dollar terms, are deferred to the later
years of the plan, with 70 percent of
the total being realized in FY1997 and
FY1998; 2) through FY1995, revenue
increases actually exceed deficit cuts,
and cumulatively account for 75 per-
cent of the total dollar reduction in
deficits over the entire six-year horizon;
3) the plan would shift resources, via
both expenditure and tax policy, toward
nondefense discretionary spending;
and 4) the proposals would reduce the
Instead of concentrating narrowly on
the level of deficit reduction in the pro-
posed federal budget, a more compre-
hensive picture can be gleaned from
investigating the allocative consequences
of shifts in resources that will result if
the Clinton plan is adopted. Here, the
authors examine the timing and com-
position of both net outlay cuts and
net revenue increases, and the genera-
tional impact of each, to assess the
likely effects of the sweeping changes
in spending and tax priorities repre-
sented in the administration's stimu-
lus package and First budget proposal.
net payment burden on future genera-
tions implied by existing fiscal policies.
• The Bottom Line
Change requires a status quo. In Vision,
the status quo is defined as the outlay
and revenue paths that would be real-
ized given the enacted FY1993 budget,
adjusted for cuts in defense spending
proposed by the Bush administration.
The difference between these revenue
and outlay paths gives the baseline defi-
cit path. According to the Clinton ad-
ministration calculations, the level of
outstanding debt at the end of FY 1998
would be roughly $440 billion less
under its plan than if the status quo fis-
cal policies were maintained.'
However, subsequent estimates by the
CBO suggest that this number is over-
stated for two reasons. First, the esti-
mates differ due to alternative technical
ISSN 0428-1276assumptions, such as the amount of
revenue that will be collected from in-
creasing marginal tax rates. Second,
the Clinton administration failed to in-
clude spending cuts mandated by the
Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 (BEA)
in its estimates of baseline outlays. Be-
cause these cuts are required under cur-
rent law, the outlay reductions necessary
to meet BEA spending limits should
not be counted as spending changes
brought about by the Clinton plan.
BOX 1 CBO ADJUSTMENTS TO THE CLINTON DEFICIT
REDUCTION ESTIMATES
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Box 1 summarizes the effects of the
CBO reestimates of the Clinton deficit
reductions. According to CBO calcula-
tions, by the end of FY1998 the Clin-
ton plan would actually result in $355
billion less debt than the status quo fis-
cal policy, holding all else fixed.
Throughout the balance of this presen-
tation, we will use the CBO projections
unless otherwise indicated.
• A Brief Word on the
Definition of Spending
Some confusion has been generated by
terminology used in the administra-
tion's budget presentation. For example,
taxes on Social Security benefits are
sometimes identified as spending cuts,
and investment tax credits as spending
increases. Although these rhetorical
choices can be supported by reasonable
economic arguments, they do not con-
form to standard budgetary classifica-
tions, which would treat the former as
a positive revenue item and the latter as
a negative one.
We identify revenues and outlays ac-
cording to their conventional defini-
tions, which are those that would be
legally controlling in the budget
process.
7 Our choice in this regard is
motivated by our desire for clarity, and we
make it without passing judgment on the
administration's semantics.
• The Timing of Revenue
Increases and Deficit Reduction
Figure 1 illustrates the year-by-year
amounts of deficit reduction and revenue
increases implied by the Clinton plan.
The reductions amount to less than $20
billion in FY1994, but rise to $117 bil-
lion in FY 1997 and $131 billion in
Accumulated Deficits, FY 1993-98: Baseline
Accumulated Deficits, FY 1993-98: Clinton Plan
Administration Deficit Reduction Estimates
CBO Adjustments















FY1998. In general, the bulk of the
deficit cuts is deferred to later years:
Including a $7 billion increase in FY
1993, the Clinton proposal would
shrink the deficit by less than $40 bil-
lion through FY1995. Afull 70percent
of the promised curtailment is to be
realized in FY1997-98.
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Like deficit reductions, revenue in-
creases rise in dollar value as the plan
is implemented over time. However, in
FY1994 and FY1995, revenue in-
creases exceed the amount by which the
deficit is pared down. This, of course,
means that revenues in these years fi-
nance the entire amount of deficit
reduction and actually support net gains
in outlays. Not until FY1996 does the
deficit contraction exceed the amount
of extra revenue that the Clinton plan
would deliver, and even then revenues
account for more than 80 percent of
that year's reduction.
Through FY1998, the Clinton plan
would generate $267 billion of revenue
beyond the amount that would be col-
lected under current policy. This figure
would represent 75 percent of the total
deficit reduction if the plan is imple-
mented as presented. In other words, 75
cents of every dollar of deficit reduction
is slated to come from revenue increases.
• A Closer Look at the Revenue Side
Figure 2 illustrates the year-by-year and
cumulative distribution of all items in the
Clinton plan that increase federal reve-
nues. The largest single category is as-
sociated with higher taxation of "high-
income" individuals. These revenues
would be generated by increasing the
top marginal tax rate to 36 percent, add-
ing a surcharge on taxable incomes in
excess of $250,000, eliminating the
limit on the amount of wage income
subject to the Medicare payroll tax, and
increasing estate taxes. Revenues from
these sources would account for about
64 percent of gross revenue increases
in FY1994 and for about 44 percent
cumulatively.
The proposed energy tax is the next-
largest revenue item, accounting for 23
percent of gross revenue increases
through FY1998, although much less
in the plan's first two full years. Busi-
ness taxes account for about 16 percent
of the hike, primarily due to a rise in
the corporate tax rate and to new re-
strictions on deductions for business
meal and entertainment expenses. In-
creased taxation of Social Security
benefits, which has generated much
public discussion, would in fact ac-
count for a relatively small amount of
the total revenue increase, between 6
and 7 percent.
The extra revenue from all of these
changes actually sums to more than the
$267 billion in net increases shown in
figure 1. That is, the amount collected
by these taxes will exceed $267 billion
because the administration plan in-
cludes a variety of tax credits and sub-
sidies, which together would amount to
about 21 percent of the gross revenues
that the proposal would generate through
FY1998. The distribution of these tax
incentives is illustrated in figure 3. Ap-
proximately 70 percent of the total isdivided equally between earned-income
tax credits for the working poor and in-
vestment tax credits for firms. Most of the
balance consists of sundry tax breaks for
various activities labeled "infrastructure"
by the administration, which include tax
credits for low-income housing construc-
tion, research and experimentation expen-
ditures, and enterprise-zone investments.
• A Closer Look at the Outlay Side
The Clinton plan would significantly
shift federal spending priorities. Figure
4 illustrates the change that would re-
sult in four distinct outlay categories:
defense, nondefense discretionary, man-
datory, and net interest. Discretionary
spending involves all forms of outlays,
including defense, that are subject to
the usual appropriations process. Man-
datory expenditures include the major
entitlement programs such as Social
Security and Medicare.
Defense, mandatory, and net interest out-
lays would all ultimately decline relative
to their baseline paths if the Clinton plan
is realized. However, nondefense discre-
tionary spending would actually be
higher in each of the years from FY1993
through FY1998. This comes as no sur-
prise, since most of the spending pro-
grams that candidate Clinton advocated
— highway construction funds, job train-
ing programs, directed technology expen-
ditures, expanded Head Start funding —
fall into this category.
Over the entire 1993-98 period, de-
fense outlays would be reduced by
about $112 billion and other discretion-
ary outlays would rise by about $107
billion, leaving total discretionary out-
lays virtually the same as under the stat-
us quo policy. Thus, most of the net
outlay reductions in the Clinton plan
come from the mandatory and net inter-
est categories. The former are primarily
associated with projected Medicare sav-
ings and the latter with lower deficits.
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• Putting the Outlay and Revenue
Changes in a Generational Context
Implicit in the figures discussed to this
point is a change in the generational bur-
den of federal tax and expenditure pro-
grams. A gauge of the proposals' direct
FIGURE 1 REVENUE INCREASES AND DEFICIT REDUCTION








SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office.
FIGURE 2 DISTRIBUTION OF REVENUE INCREASES BY TYPE
IN THE CLINTON PLAN
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impact in redistributing resources among
living and future generations can be ob-
tained by performing calculations that
yield a set of generational accounts.
Generational accounting is based on the
government's intertemporal budget con-
straint, which states that the present
value of government spending must be
paid out of the government's net
wealth, resources taken from existing
generations, and resources taken from
future generations. Given no change in
either the government's net wealth or
spending policy, policies that increase
the amount taken from living genera-
tions imply that future generations will
have to pay less. Alternatively, an en-
actment of spending cuts with no
change in the net payment burdens of
living generations will also translate in-
to lower burdens on future generations.
A generational account is the present
value of taxes net of government trans-fers that each member of a given gener-
ation may expect to pay over his or her
remaining lifetime.
L For each genera-
tion, the difference between its genera-
tional account computed under baseline
projections and that computed under
the Clinton proposals indicates the im-
pact of the plan on its net payment bur-
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dens. Suppose, for example, that
under the Clinton plan an average male
bom in 1956 would receive an extra
$ 1,000 in unemployment benefits, tax
credits, and so on, but would pay an
extra $6,000 in assorted federal taxes
(all in present-value terms). Then the
change in the net payment burden for a
man age 35 in 1991 would be $5,000.
Figures 5 and 6 show net payment bur-
dens for living and future generations
both before and after adoption of the
Clinton plan. The figures reveal that
under today's policies, older genera-
tions can expect to receive, and middle-
aged and younger generations can ex-
pect to pay, on net, to the government
over their remaining lifetimes. Current
policies also embody a sizable imbal-
ance in that future generations will be
required to pay, on average, more than
twice as much per capita as will current
newborns if the latter are treated as they
would be under baseline policies over
their lifetimes.
President Clinton's budget proposals im-
ply a relatively minor increase in the pay-
ment burdens of all living generations.
Moreover, the changes are distributed
fairly uniformly across age and sex
groups.
1
5 Among men, the increases are
largest for young and middle-aged gener-
ations (those aged 20 to 45 in 1991),
mostly because of higher labor income
taxation. Among women, however, the
largest rise in payment burdens is for gen-
erations aged 55 to 70 (in 1991), due pri-
marily to reduced health and Social
Security benefits. By requiring living
generations to pay more and by lowering
government spending on purchases, the
Clinton proposals reduce the per capita
payment burdens on future males by
about $30,000 and those on future fe-
males by about $14,000.
Generational accounting does not re-
veal the set of spending, tax, and trans-
FIGURE 3 DISTRIBUTION OF TAX INCENTIVES BY TYPE
IN THE CLINTON PLAN
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fer changes that would best redress the
imbalance in current fiscal policy. It is
useful only for evaluating the impact of
a given set of policy changes on inter-
generational redistribution. While they
fall far short of eliminating the imbal-
ance in current fiscal policy, the Clinton
proposals are, on this count, a step in
the right direction.
• Concluding Remarks
On balance, the allocative aspects of
the Clinton plan are more striking than
the amount of deficit reduction that it
would deliver. Using CBO estimates
and economic assumptions, the federal
deficit under the administration plan
would equal about 3 percent of GDP in
FY1998, or about the same percentage
that was realized in FY1989 under the
final budget of the Reagan administra-
tion, and the last one prior to the pro-
longed period of sluggish economic
growth that commenced in 1990.
This comparison indicates why judging
fiscal policy by the level of the deficit
can be highly misleading. Although the
deficits implied by the Clinton adminis-
tration's proposals would basically re-turn us to the deficit-to-GDP ratios that
characterized the latter part of the
1980s, the plan does indeed represent a
major shift in the fiscal policy mix. Fur-
thermore, the recent budget resolutions
passed by the House and Senate do lit-
tle to alter these changing priorities.
Thus, in all probability, the plan's suc-
cess or failure will ultimately be judged
not on the dollar amount of resulting
deficits, but on whether the shifts in
resources identified in this article de-
liver the economic prosperity that the
administration has promised.
• Footnotes
1. Some technical and program adjust-
ments were made in the April budget docu-
ment, but these were minor. Thus, the es-
sence of the Clinton plan is well represented
by information contained in Vision.
2. Although the FY1993 budget was devel-
oped and passed during the Bush administra-
tion, the Clinton proposals do contemplate
changes in outlays and deficits that would
become effective in the current fiscal year.
Accordingly, we include FY1993 budget
changes in our analysis.
3. The OMB figures assume the same mac-
roeconomic outcomes when calculating
both baseline deficits and projected deficits
under the Clinton plan. These estimates
were provided by the CBO. To summarize
briefly, the projections assume that real
GDP will grow by 2.8 percent in 1993 and
then decline toward the assumed long-run
growth rate of 2 percent after increasing
slightly in 1994. The unemployment rate is
projected to fall steadily from 7.1 percent in
1993 to 5.7 percent in 1998. The CP1 infla-
tion rate and the 10-year Treasury note rate
are expected to remain fairly stable, averag-
ing 2.7 percent and 5.5 percent, respectively.
Short-term interest rates, measured by the
average return on 91-day Treasury bills, are
projected to increase from 3.2 percent in
1993 to 4.9 percent in 1998.
We note that the administration does expect
more robust economic activity if its policy
proposals are implemented. However, its ar-
chitects have chosen to avoid "rosy scenario"
accusatioas by applying the conservative CBO
assumptions to their own deficit projections.
4. Information on CBO adjustments to the
administration projections are taken from
preliminary estimates as of March 23, 1993.
The CBO estimates do not include changes
made between the publication of Vision and
that of the formal FY1994 budget proposal,
such as revisions in the proposed energy tax.
FIGURE 5 NET PAYMENT BURDEN ON MALES IN THE 1991
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5, For an overview of BEA, see David
Altig, "Some Fiscal Advice for the New
Government: Don't Let the Sun Go Down
on BEA," Federal Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Economic Commentary,
February 1, 1993.
6. President Clinton expressed general con-
fidence in CBO projections in his State of
the Union address, given the same day that
Vision was released. Also, additional spend-
ing cuts recently proposed by the House and
Senate budget committees were at least par-
tially designed to adjust for the shortfalls
identified by the CBO.7. For example, infrastructure investment
would typically fall under the category of
"discretionary" outlays, which are limited
by BEA. However, spending that is gener-
ated by investment tax credits would show
up in net revenues and hence would not be
subject to BEA limits.
8. Aware that postponing the bulk of the
proposed deficit cuts to later years raises the
issue of credibility, the administration has
proposed that spending limits similar to those
legislated by BEA in 1990 coincide with pas-
sage of the budget. The current BEA limits
are applicable through FYI995. Adjustments
to the administration's proposals that were
passed out of the House and Senate budget
committees in the week ending March 12 were
apparently made in part to ensure that existing
BEA spending restrictions are honored.
9. This number rises to 83 cents if outlay
reductions associated with lower net interest
payments are excluded from the spending cuts.
The administration estimates that under its plan,
total net revenues and receipts will rise by about
$293 billion over the FY1993-98 period.
10. CBO updates on specific revenue items
were not available as of this writing. The dis-
tributions presented in this section are based
on numbers reported in Vision and in the
FY1994 budget document.
11. The totals for discretionary, mandatory,
and net interest outlays are all taken from the
March CBO estimates. We divide total discre-
tionary outlays into defense and nondefense
components using the administration proposals
presented in Vision. In so doing, we implicitly
assume that all of the discretionary spending
cuts required to meet BEA limits in FY1994
and FY 1995 come from nondefense programs.
12. The administration estimates of net in-
terest reductions include projected savings
from changing the maturity structure of the
outstanding stock of debt. These cost reduc-
tions are not included in the CBO estimates,
which are the basis for the numbers we
present.
13. A generation is defined as all members of
a given age and sex. More detailed explana-
tions of the generational accounting concepts
can be found in Chapter 26 of Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 1993.
See also Alan J. Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gok-
hale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, "Generational
Accounts: A New Approach to Fiscal Policy
Evaluation," Federal Reserve Bank of Cleve-
land, Economic Commentary, November 15,
1991.
14. For purposes of calculating the genera-
tional accounts, the baseline projections are
taken from the OMB's Mid-Session Review
of the Fiscal Year 1993 Budget. July 1992.
Evaluation of the Clinton proposals is based
entirely on data reported in Vision.
15. As a result of the proposals, older gen-
erations may expect a reduction in receipts
over their remaining lifetimes.
16. While the health care measures an-
nounced thus far mainly affect the incomes of
health care providers, the generational ac-
counting exercise assumes that these will be
passed along in the form of reduced benefits.
Also, increased Social Security taxation
amounts to a reduction in net benefits.
17. Because of resistance in the Senate, the
fate of the stimulus part of the Clinton plan,
which includes about $17.8 billion of spend-
ing and $6.4 billion of tax incentives, was
still in doubt as of this writing.
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